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Introduction
Despite the manifest diversity of the
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, there
is still the tendency among scholars
focusing on this group, to treat them
as a monolithic entity, by referring to
all of them as "Chinese" or "Overseas
Chinese." Within the countries them-
selves, as In Indonesia, for instance,
this tendency is apparent among the
majority population in the use of the
terms "orang Cina," "orang Tionghoa"
or even "hoakiau."D It is our conten-
tion that these terms should only be
applied to those who are alien, not of
mixed ancestry, and who initially do
not plan to stay permanently. We also
submit that, what terminology and what
definition is used for this group, has
important implications culturally, so-
cially, psychologically and especially for
policy considerations.
* Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Ja-
karta, Indonesia
I) The terms "orang Cina" or "orang Tion-
ghoa" are Indonesian for "Chinese." The
term "Cina" is considered by ethnic Chinese,
especially in Java, to have a derogatory
meaning. For an explanation of the use of
these two terms, see Coppel and Suryadinata
[1970].
As recent writIngs indicate, the term
more commonly used today is "ethnic
Chinese" to refer to the group as a
whole, regardless of citizenship, cultural
orientation and social identification.2)
The term ethnic or ethnicity, refers to
a socio-cultural entity. In the case of
the ethnic Chinese, it refers to a group
with cultural elements recognizable as
or attributable to Chinese, while socially,
members of this group identify and are
identified by others as constituting a
distinct group.
The above definition IS III line with
the use in recent writings on this topic.
In the last ten years or so, we note a
revival of interest In ethnicity and
ethnic groups, due to the realization
that the newly-developed as well as the
established countries In Europe and
North America are heterogeneous socie-
ties with problems In the relations
2) At the Symposium "Changing Identities of
the Southeast Asian Chinese since World
War II," organized by the Australian Na-
tional University in Canberra in June 1985
(the present author was a participant at this
symposium), the use of the term "ethnic Chi-
nese" as against "overseas Chinese" was dis-
cussed and it appeared that the participants
were more in favor of using the first term.
One of the more recent publications that




a case in point,
between the variOUS
Ireland, of course, is
as IS Belgium, Canada.
In the case of Indonesia, to deter-
mine who the ethnic Chinese are, is
a rather complicated matter. First,
there is the distinction by citizenship
into aliens and citizens. This is not
too much of a problem, as aliens form
a separate category and are registered
with the appropriate section In the
immigration office. Then there is the
distinction by cultural orientation and
social identification. Here, we suggest,
we have to think in terms of a con-
tinuum.
At one end, there are those, mostly
of the younger generation, who identify
completely and solely as Indonesian,
and whose cultural orientation is also
Indonesian. Examples of individuals in
this category are the late Soe Hok
Gie, a student activist during the 1965-
1966 upheaval, his social scientist
brother Arief Budiman, who is married to
a Minangkabau woman, the brothers
Jusuf and Sofjan Wanandi, Christianto
Wibisono, all of the "1966-generation"
fame.4> Also, artists like the nationally
renowned playwright and film director
Teguh Karya, and one of the most
popular actresses up to the time of
her death in the mid-70's, the late
Fifi Young.
At the other end, there are those
3) Some of the important work in this area
that have appeared since the 1970's are:
Barth [1969], Rex [1983 (first ed. 1970)],
Glazer and Moynihan [1975], Banton [1983],
Stone [1985], and Stavenhagen [1986].
who are usually referred to as "totok,"
who are culturally Chinese-oriented by
4) Jusuf Wanandi (born in West Sumatra,
1937) has a law degree from the University
of Indonesia. He was a student activist
during the 1965-1966 upheaval, a promi-
nent leader of the KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi
Mahasiswa Indonesia or Action Unit of
Indonesian Students). He is an active
member of the executive board of Golkar
(Golongan Karya, the government-backed
political party). He has been a member
of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
(MPR) (People's Consultative Assembly)
since 1972. He is affiliated with the well-
known Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), serving as a member of
the Council of Directors and Chairman of
Foreign Relations. He has written among
others for Newsweek magazine, the Far East-
ern Economic Review and the Asian Survey.
Sofjan Wanandi is a younger brother of
Jusuf (born in West Sumatra, 1941). He
did not finish his study in economics at the
University of Indonesia. Like his brother he
was a student activist during the 1965-1966
upheaval. He became a member of Parlia-
ment from 1967-1971 and then member of
the MPR from 1971-1983. According to
Apa dan Siapa (Who's Who) of Tempo maga-
zine, in 1983, he was President Director of
PT Garuda Mataram Motors Company
and Director of PT Pakarti Yoga. Source:
Apa dan Siapa sejumlah orang Indonesia 1983-
1984 [Who's Who of a number of Indo-
nesians, 1983-1984] [1984: 1115-1117].
Christianto Wibisono (born in Semarang,
1945) has a degree from the Faculty of Social
Sciences of the University of Indonesia. He
was also an activist in 1965-1966. He was
one of the founders of Tempo weekly magazine
in 1970 and in 1980 moved on to set up
and become the director of Pusat Data
Business Indonesia (Indonesian Business
Data Center), which compiles data on vari-
ous aspects of the Indonesian economy. He
also published two volumes of his writings
in the mass media under the title Kearah
Indonesia Incorporated (Towards Indonesia,
Inc.) [1985]. Source: Apa dan Siapa ...
[1984: 1126-1127].
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the fact that they usually have had
a Chinese-language education and speak
Mandarin or one of the Chinese dia-
lects with one another. Most of them
5) For an analysis of the citizenship problem
through 1958, the best study is still Willmott
[1961]. For the subsequent developments,
regarding the dual nationality treaty be-
tween Indonesia and the PRC, its implemen-
tation and unilateral abrogation in 1969,
see Coppel [1983: 38, 39 and 155, 156].
Still further developments occurred in 1980
with the Presidential Instruction number 2,
1980 (Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia,
No.2, 1980), on Proof of Citizenship of
the Republic of Indonesia (Bukti Kewarga-
negaraan Republik Indonesia) issued on
31 January 1980 and its implementation
to be valid until 17 August 1980. This
measure was meant to give legal certainty
(de jure) to those who are considered de facto
citizens, but who do not have the docu-
ments to prove this, by providing them
with a Certificate of Proof of Citizenship
of the Republic of Indonesia (Surat Bukti
Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia or
SBKRI). Another measure is the Presi-
dential Decision No. 13, 1980 (Keputusan
Presiden No. 13, 1980), on the procedure
for the application of citizenship issued on
11 February 1980. This measure was meant
to make the procedure for naturalization
for aliens· faster, easier and cheaper. No
time limit was given for the implementation
of this measure. These two measures on
citizenship, especially the first one, have
probably influenced the outcome of the
1980 Census (taken in October, about 2
months after the deadline of the first mea-
sure), when the number of alien Chinese is
stated as 462,314, a drastic drop from the
1,028,935 in the 1971 Census [Indonesia,
Biro Pusat Statistik 1982: 82]. For an
English translation of the text on the Sino-
Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality of
22 April 1955 and the text of the Presiden-
tial Decision No. 13, 1980 on the procedure
for naturalization, see Suryadinata [1985:
Appendix 5 (166-172) and Appendix 7
(178-182)].
have Indonesian citizenship through nat-
uralization or, if born in Indonesia,
through the various laws enacted and
implemented in the 1950's and 1960's.5)
Some of the businessmen often referred
to in the foreign press recently fall
into this category. The names that
could be mentioned are Liem Sioe
Liong or Sedono Salim, Mochtar Riady,
The Ning King, Go Swie Kie. 6)
In between these two extremes is a
whole range of people in various stages
of acculturation to and identification
with Indonesian society. They are com-
monly referred to as "peranakan,"
people of mixed ancestry, whose daily
language is Indonesian and often also
the regional language of their area of
birth. Many of them have become
Protestant or Catholic and more recently
there is also conversion to Islam.
Another characteristic of the ethnic
Chinese in Indonesia is their status as
a minority group. This is because of
their size, which, based on various cal-
culations, is estimated at no more than
3% of the total population,?) but even
more because of the economiC role
they have played Since the Dutch
colonial period. As such they are con-
sidered similar to the Jews in Europe,
6) These are names that also appear in Apa
dan Siapa ... [1984: 427-430, 684--686, 1072-
1073]. For detailed information on these
people, including Go Swie Kie, see Robison
[1986: Chapter 9].
7) Suryadinata [1985: 5, 6] estimates the num-
ber of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia at 4.1
million or 2.8% of the total population of
147 million in the 1980 Census.
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the Indians in East Africa, the Arabs
in West Africa, the Vietnamese in the
former Indo-China. It has been sug-
gested by various writers to refer to
these people as "middleman minorities."8)
We have to make a clear distinction,
however, between these minorities, who
are originally migrants or non-indigenous
and those who are indigenous. In this
paper we are concerned with the non-
indigenous only. These migrants ini-
tially carne with the idea of returning
to their land of origin, making them
what is referred to as "sojourners."
However, many of them eventually set-
tled in the new country, established
families with local women and gradually
formed distinct communities. A new
wave of movement of peoples across
8) The concept of "middleman minority" has
been developed by Blalock, Jr. [1967: 79-
84]. These are minorities who "occupy
intermediate positions owing to a competi-
tive advantage or a high adaptive capacity.
Such minorities are often associated with
special occupational niches by virtue of a
combination of circumstances, plus a cultural
heritage that has been used as an adaptive
mechanism over a prolonged period." As
examples of this group he mentions the
history of the Jews in Europe, the Chinese
in Southeast Asia, East Indians in Burma
and South Africa. Blalock's ideas have
been further developed in Turner and
Bonacich [1980: 144-158], in which they
propose a composite theory developing 9
propositions to account for the conditions
promoting the (1) concentration of ethnic
populations in middle-rank economic roles,
(2) development of patterns of intragroup
solidarity, (3) hostility from the nonethnic
population. These propositions can be
applied to the ethnic Chinese in Indo-
nesia, at least for the beginning of the for-
mation of the community.
national boundaries, often on a mas-
sive scale, has occurred shortly before
and after World War II and the van-
ous regional wars and upheavals SInce
then. For instance, in Britain, the en-
trance of people from the Commonwealth
countries; in Western Europe, the in-
flux of "gastarbeiters," and the dispersal
and subsequent settlement of Vietnamese
in various parts of the world. 9)
Having made clear that we view
the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as an
ethnic minority group, our approach
is social-structural, in the sense that
we look at the situation of the ethnic
Chinese in terms of minority-majority
group relations. Therefore, our em-
phasis is on social-structural rather than
on social-psychological variables.
This paper is concerned with the
whole group of ethnic Chinese as part
of the Indonesian population, and their
role in the ongoing process of national
development. We will therefore start
with the New Order government, when
Indonesia initiated its systematic de-
velopment with the first 5 Year De-
velopment Plan in 1969.
One of the striking elements of this
Plan is the pragmatic approach in its
formulation and implementation. This
is indicated by the fact that in the
rehabilitation of the economy starting
In 1967, resources In the hands of
ethnic Chinese, be they citizens or
aliens, were included in the develop-
9) See Rex [1983: especially Chapters 4 and
7]. Also Vermeulen [1984].
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ment endeavors. 10) This opportunity to
participate more fully in the economy
was well received by the ethnic Chinese
business community, and as we see
today, some of them have succeeded in
developing major companies of interna-
tional proportions.
In this paper we will discuss the
role of the ethnic Chinese in the de-
velopment process, by focusing not only
on their role in the economy, but also
on other aspects in the efforts towards
development of the society. To this
end, we will start with some demo-
graphic aspects, i.e. their role in the
efforts of the government to control
population growth, their economic role,
and finally we will discuss the social
and cultural aspects of the ethnic
Chinese problem.
Som.e Dem.ographic Aspects of the
Ethnic Chinese Population
Compared with the other ASEAN
countries, Indonesia with 2.8% (in
1981, using an estimation of 4.1 million
10) This is stated in the Instruction of the Pre-
sidium of the Cabinet, 7 June 1967: "Dif-
ferent from foreign capital as defined in Law
No.1, 1967, capital that is acquired and
accumulated within the territory of Indonesia,
i.e. domestic foreign capital, is basically
national wealth that is in the hands of aliens
and should therefore be mobilized, developed
and utilized for the benefit of rehabilitation
and development." (translation by the pres-
ent author). It was further stipulated that
this domestic foreign capital is not allowed
to be transferred abroad. For an English
translation of the full text of this document
see Suryadinata [1985: Appendix 6 (173-
177)].
out of the total of 147 million In the
1980 Census), has the second lowest
proportion of ethnic Chinese after the
Phillippines with 1.5%, Thailand with
13.00/0' Brunei-Darussalam with 25.4%,
Malaysia with 33.1 % and Singapore
with 76.90/0. 11) The figure of 4.1 mil-
lion includes both the citizens and the
aliens. As according to the 1980 Census
there are 462,314 alien Chinese (a
drastic drop from the 1,028,935 in the
1971 Census), those who are citizens
should be about 3.6 million. 12)
Nonetheless, despite this small pro-
portion, Indonesia has what is usually
referred to as "masalah Cina" or the
Chinese problem. In terms of size,
the majority indigenous population per-
ceives this group to be too large in
number and growing too fast. Conse-
quently, there have been accusations
that the ethnic Chinese are not par-
ticipating in the national efforts to-
wards fertility reduction, I.e. in the
family planning program.
Interestingly, the National Family
Planning Coordinating Board (NFPCB),
considered these accusations senous
enough to initiate KAP (knowledge,
attitude and practice) studies on the
ethnic Chinese in vanous cities with
high concentration of this group, in-
cluding Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung,
Semarang, Medan, Ujung Pandang.
There are two other studies that are
relevant in this context. One is an
in-depth study of women in Jakarta,
11) See Suryadinata [1985: 5-7].
12) See Note 5 above.
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which includes a sample on ethnic
Chinese and the other is a study on
the relationship between ethnicity and
fertility, comprising 5 ethnic groups
(Javanese, Sundanese, Minangkabau,
Batak and ethnic Chinese), in 4 cities
(Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Medan).13)
Some of the findings of these studies
that are pertinent to this paper are as
follows:
1. The ethnic Chinese practice family
planning by consulting private I
personal physicians and not under
the national family planning program;
2. Their age at first marriage is higher
than that of the other ethnic groups;
3. Their average number of living
children is lower than that of the
other ethnic groups;
4. The ideal number of children IS
lower than that of the other ethnic
groups;
5. Similar to the other groups, there
is variation by age and education
of the wife. Among the ethnic
Chinese there is also variation by
religion, i.e. Protestant / Catholic or
Buddhist / Confucianist.
The attitude towards not using the
government program appears to be
13) The KAP studies consulted are those on East
Java and South Sulawesi [Pardoko and
Indroes 1981]. The one on South Sulawesi
was done by a team of Hasanudin University:
Laporan HasH Penelitian PSP-KB WNI
Keturunan Cina di Sulawesi Se1atan (Report
on the KAP study on citizens of Chinese
descent in South Sulawesi), Hasanudin
University, Ujung Pandang, 1980. The
other two studies consulted are: Rahardjo
et at. [1980] and Tan and Soeradji [1986].
changing, however, probably as a re-
sult of special efforts on the part of
the NFPCB to reach this group. In
1984, for instance, the present author
was invited at the main office of the
NFPCB in Jakarta, to meet with a
group of ethnic Chinese women from
Banyuwangi (East Java), who were
awarded a certificate for having suc-
cessfully practiced family planning.
What is most interesting of the re-
sults of these studies on the ethnic
Chinese is that, contrary to the per-
ception of the majority population, the
performance In family planning IS
generally better than that of the other
indigenous ethnic groups. This can be
explained as the advantage of being
an urban population. They have some
distinct urban characteristics, such as
more receptive to new ideas and ap-
proaches, better education and better
health condition. Most of them are
in urban occupations that are better
remunerated, such as business, trade,
services, the professions. The wives are
also better-educated, are often a part-
ner in the business or are themselves
in some profession. These characteristics
are conductive to the development of
a more pragmatic attitude, facilitating
the ability to live in a more rational
way, as in planning the number of
children to have and the future educa-
tion of these children. The finding
that ethnic Chinese families tend to
consult with personal/private physicians
concerning family planning matters is
a clear indication that they themselves
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are motivated to adhere to the small
family norm exhorted by the national
family planning program.
The Role in the Econorny
Studies on the economy of Indonesia
invariably point to the importance of
the economic role of the ethnic Chinese.
I t IS also generally recognized that
this role is the major source of conflict
situations between this group and the
majority ethnic Indonesians. Due to
this role in the economy, this group IS
referred to as "middleman minority."
Today, however, it is not only as "mid-
dleman"; their role has expanded into
all areas of the economy, including
manufacturing, shipping, construction,
banking. As such, they are now part
of the most important capitalists in the
country. 14)
There is no doubt that the attitude
of the government and its policies,
are a major factor in this development.
In the rehabilitation of the economy,
the Suharto government took the ap-
proach of utilizing the capital and
entrepreneurial skills of the ethnic
Chinese. Not surprisingly, this policy
received a positive response from this
group. The subsequent re-entry of for-
eign investment was advantageous for
them as they were in the best position
to enter joint venture arrangements.
This gave them access to international
capital in addition to the access to the
14) See Robison [1986: especially Chapter 9].
Also, Thee and Yoshihara [1987: especially
346-349].
existing network of Overseas Chinese
capital and business in other Southeast
and East Asian countries.
This development was facilitated by
the emergence of a phenomenon com-
monly referred to as "cukongisme,"
the mutually beneficial alliance in eco-
nomIC ventures with civilian and/or
military high officials. 15) As Robison
observes: "Both generals and interna-
tional investors were attracted to Chinese
capitalists because they had the necessary
corporate, capital and distributive appa-
ratus in place, and the business 'culture'
essential to the making of profits. "16)
To date the book by Robison IS
perhaps the most comprehensive expose
of the development of ethnic Chinese
big entrepreneurs In the Indonesian
economy. Interestingly enough, of the
41 groups of companies listed in this
book, involving 46 names of the owners,
only 12 have no Indonesian name be-
sides their Chinese name. I7 ) This could
mean that these people are aliens, or,
it may indicate that at a certain scale
of company it is no longer necessary
to change one's name. At any rate,
Liem Sioe Liong, the best-known ethnic
Chinese businessman, is usually referred
to in the press by his Chinese name,
rather than by his Indonesian name
Sudono Salim. William Soerjadjaja, on
the other hand, is not known by his
15) On "cukong," "cukong system" and criti-
cism of it, see Suryadinata [1978: 141, 142].
Also Tan [1976: 25], Robison [1986:
272-275].
16) See Robison [1986: 273].
17) See Robison [1986: 278-288].
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Chinese name Tjia Kian Liong. The
same goes for Bob Hasan (The Kian
Siang), Ciputra (Tjie Siem Hoan) ,
Masagung (Tjio Wie Tay) , Mochtar
Riady. Nevertheless, whatever name
they themselves use, the Indonesian
business community and the society at
large, identify them as ethnic Chinese
and their companies as ethnic Chinese
companies.
This is evident in times of social
unrest and outbreaks of riots, whatever
the cause, when ethnic Chinese com-
panies have been sought out and be-
come targets of violence. In this sense
the ethnic Chinese businessmen are
basically in a tenuous position. Their
existence in Indonesia is dependent on
the position of their ethnic Indonesian
associates who in turn are vulnerable
to the vagaries of the political and
economic situation in general.
Here again, the role of the govern-
ment is crucial. On the one hand,
the government seems unable to bring
about a change in the situation where
the dominant element in the private
sector is the ethnic Chinese businessman;
on the other hand, it faces strong criti-
cism from indigenous entrepreneurs and
the majority society at large, who per-
ceive favoritism to ethnic Chinese and
the so-called "cukong issue." This crit-
ICIsm was more vocal in the early
seventies and was translated into overt
actions of violence during the so-called
"malari riots" of 1974. 18)
As a result, the government was
constrained to introduce major policies
to curtail the perceived dominance of
the ethnic Chinese and achieve a more
proportionate participation of ethnic
Indonesians in the economy. As for
instance, the regulations of 1979 and
1980, known as Keppres 14 and 14(a),
which were intended to give more op-
portunity to indigenous contractors and
suppliers to benefit from government
contracts.19)
Despite these policies, however, ethnic
Chinese companies have continued to
grow and expand into international
concerns. It is also obvious that their
ethnic Indonesian counterparts have ben-
efited from these developments. To
quote Robison again: "For the gen-
erals and the larger indigenous capital-
ists, the Chinese have become a vital
element in their social and economic
dominance, by providing both revenue
and corporate and commercial infra-
structure. The economic fortunes of the
emerging indigenous Indonesian ruling
class are firmly intertwined with those
of the Chinese."20)
Still, the situation of the ethnic
Chinese businessmen can best be char-
acterized as fraught with uncertainty.
18) On "Malari" (an acronym referring to the
date of the incident, 15 January 1974), and
its aftermath especially in terms of economic
policies, see Robison [1986: 164-168]. Also
Mackie [1976: 137]. He observes that this
event was not primarily an anti-Chinese
outbreak, but directed towards" ... the most
conspicuous symbols of wealth and high
living among the Indonesian elite, the
Chinese and foreigners."
19) See Robison [1986: 185, 316-317]. Also
Cappel [1983: 154].
20) See Robison [1986: 317].
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Although the last major outbreak of
violence occurred in 1974 (the "malari
incident"), an undercurrent of resent-
ment continues. This has come to the
surface, for example, in an incident in
Solo and Semarang towards the end of
1980, the bombing incident of Chinese-
owned banks in Jakarta in 1984 and
the "Tanjong Priok incident" in Jakarta
in the same year. Under these cir-
cumstances it is not surprising to hear
comments that some of these big
businessmen have expanded overseas to
secure their position. It is even said
that some have settled their families
abroad, so as to make it easy to re-
move themselves should this become
necessary.
How do the ethnic Indonesian business-
men perceive this situation? In this
context a book written by one of the
young ethnic Indonesian businessmen
considered successful In real estate,
Siswono Yudo Husodo, is quite reveal-
ing. This book, which was published
in 1985, can be considered an auto-
biography focusing on his relations with
ethnic Chinese. The views expressed
towards this group can be characterized
minimally as ambiguous. For instance,
he mentions about an ethnic Chinese
business colleague of his, who has his
wife and children live in Singapore,
while he himself goes there twice a
week. In the author's view, this person
measures the values of country and
nation solely in terms of the opportu-
nity for business and profit making.
Although he obviously condemns this
- 71
attitude, he observes that Indonesia
probably needs people like him, as
they make large investments in Indo-
nesia, thereby contributing to the de-
velopment of the economy.2D
Again, commenting on reports in the
press that Liem Sioe Liong is one of
the richest men in the world, he said
that it made him feel proud. But,
" in all honesty, I have to admit
that I would feel even more pleased
and proud, if the richest man from
Indonesia is not Gom Liem, whom
I highly respect, but for instance, Pro-
bosutedjo, or Sukamdani, Aburizal
Bakrie, Pardede, Arifin Panigoro, Haji
Kala, Poncho Sutowo or Abdul Latif or
some other indigenous entrepreneur."22)
So far, we have focused on the big
entrepreneurs, the so-called capitalists in
the Indonesian economy. Actually, by
far the majority of the ethnic Chinese
businesses are of the small and medium
type, especially in retail trade, but
also in manufacturing.
For an illustration of the role in this
type of business, we will look at a study
done in 1979 in Banda Aceh, the capi-
tal of the province of the Special Area
of Aceh. 23) Acehnese are known to be
strict adherents of Islam and the pro-
vince is often referred to as "serambi
Mekah" or "the gate of Mecca."
However, as in most other cities In
Indonesia, Banda Aceh also has a
21) See Siswono [1985: 20].
22) See Siswano [1985: 24]. According to the
author people usually call Liem Sioe Liong
"Oom" (Dutch for "uncle") Liem.
23) See Ahok [1976].
371
business area, where many of the shops
are owned and operated by ethnic
Chinese. In the aftermath of the abor-
tive coup of 1965, anti-Chinese feelings
in this area ran very high, and most
of the ethnic Chinese either removed
themselves on their own or were re-
moved by the authorities and set up in
camps in Medan.24J
Nevertheless, beginning in 1970 they
started returning, first for short visits
for which a permit was needed, but
eventually, as these restrictions were
relaxed, they stayed permanently. By
1975, according to the registration at
the regional office of the Department of
Trade, the number of ethnic Chinese
in medium and small enterprises and
as owners of stores, exceeded that of
ethnic Indonesians. In medium enter-
prises 79 were owned by ethnic
Chinese (all citizens) and 52 by ethnic
Indonesians; in small enterprises, 197
were ethnic Chinese (1 alien), and 190
ethnic Indonesian; of the store owners,
135 were ethnic Chinese (2 aliens)
and 84 ethnic Indonesian. It is in
the category of big industry that there
were 105 ethnic Indonesian and only
27 ethnic Chinese.25)
Considering that, as indicated in the
study, the ethnic Indonesians are clearly
hostile to the Chinese, how was this
return possible?
The study concludes that much of
the blame must be put on the authori-
ties, who are viewed to have been
24) See Ahok [1976: 5-7].
25) See Ahok [1976: 7 ff. and Appendix III].
inconsistent In the execution of the
policies concerning the return of Chinese
business. Acehnese respondents are
quoted as saying that Acehnese lack
leadership in business, so there are no
concerted efforts to compete with the
Chinese. They also say, that there are
among them, as among the govern-
ment officials, those who only want to
get quick and easy benefit from some
type of cooperation with an ethnic
Chinese businessman. In addition, the
public in general seems to prefer buy-
ing in Chinese stores and dealing with
Chinese business, as they have better
quality goods and give better service.26)
The results of this study indicate
that, if in an area that has shown clear
hostility, it is still possible for ethnic
Chinese to operate profitably, even more
so in less hostile areas. Thus, in small
and medium industry and in retail
trade, ethnic Chinese will probably con-
tinue to play a significant role.
We may conclude, therefore, that
the economic role of the ethnic Chinese
will not decrease. The crux of the
matter is, how is this role perceived
by the majority indigenous population.
Is this role considered an asset or a
liability? Indications are that it is still
viewed as an asset. However, undoubt-
edly, it is imperative for the indigenous
Indonesians to increase their role In
the economy substantially, in order to
reduce tensions in this area. Conversely,
it is imperative for the ethnic Chinese
to diversify into other occupations away
26) See Ahok [1976: 40, 41].
372 -72-
M.G. TAN: The Role of Ethnic Chinese Minority in Development
from the high concentration in economic
activities.
In this context, the second generation
economic elite that is now emerging,
bears watching. Many are the sons
and daughters of the new capitalists of
Indonesia, some of whom have studied
abroad and acquired foreign MBA's.
There are Anthony Salim, son of Liem
Sioe Liong; Edward Soeryadjaja, son of
William Soeryadjaja; Aburizal Bakrie
(who was proclaimed one of the Out-
standing Young Persons of the World
1986 by the Junior Chambers Interna-
tional)27> and his two brothers, sons of
Achmad Bakrie of Bakrie and Brothers;
Pontjo N ugro Susilo, son of the former
"oil king" of Indonesia Ibnu Sutowo;
Shanti Soedarpo, daughter of Soedarpo
Sastrosatomo; and the sons and daugh-
ters of President Suharto, whose busi-
ness relations have been widely reported
in the foreign press recently.28) In ad-
dition, there are those who are re-
cognized as having come up on their
own. Some of the names that have
come to the fore are Abdul Latief,
owner of the Sarinah J aya Department
Stores, Kamaluddin Bachir, who ope-
rates from Pekalongan in Central Java.29)
Nonetheless, if the structure of the
economy and business practices con-
tinue as they are today, the economic
role of the ethnic Chinese will continue
to be viewed as the source of conflict
27) Tempo November 22, 1986: 74-78.
28) See Asian Wall Street Journal November 24-,
25, 26, 1986. These 3 issues of the Journal
were banned in Indonesia.
29) Tempo November 22, 1986: 74-78.
situations between the two groups. This
in turn will result in a high probability
of the continuation of periodic, though
localized, outbreaks of social unrest.
The Social and Cultural Aspects
of the Ethnic Chinese Problem.
The multi-ethnicity of Indonesian so-
ciety is recognized in the motto of the
Republic: Bhineka Tunggal Ika or Unity
in Diversity. In reality, however, the
emphasis has been more on the unity
than on the diversity aspect. Hence,
the continuing debate on what consti-
tutes national culture, the emphasis on
nation building and the exhortations
towards unity.
One of the manifestations of this
emphasis IS the policy towards the
ethnic Chinese minority, especially re-
garding their education and overt ex-
pressions ofelements of Chinese culture.30)
The thrust of this policy is clearly
assimilationist, in the sense of the even-
tual disappearance of the ethnic Chinese
as a social-cultural entity. Over the
years, however, its implementation has
varied in consistency and strength.
A key policy towards this end, was
the closing down of all Chinese lan-
guage schools in 1966. This was relaxed
in 1969, when the government allowed
the operation of so-called "special project
national schools." These schools were
set up by prominent ethnic Chinese
30) This policy was spelled out in the Presiden-
tial Instruction No. 14, 1967, on Chinese
religion, beliefs and customs. See Coppel
[1983: 163-165].
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businessmen, with medium of instruction
In Indonesian, using the national
curriculum, but allowing for the teaching
of the Chinese language as an extra-
curricular activity. In 1975 they were
closed down however, after being
charged with violating some of the rules
for operation. The official reason given
was that as a transitional device to
accomodate the students of the closed
Chinese-language schools, they have
served their purpose.3D
Since then, all ethnic Chinese chil-
dren have to go to the regular state
or private schools. This effectively cut
off the possibility for the enculturation
of the younger generation through one
of the key aspects of their culture, i.e.
the language. A related measure was
the prohibition to sell Chinese-language
materials and to use Chinese characters
for public purposes, such as the shop
name. An exception is the government-
sponsored Chinese-language daily, Harian
Indonesia, published in Jakarta. Inter-
estingly enough, Chinese movies, usually
called Mandarin films, especially of the
kung-fu variety are allowed to be shown,
and enjoy an immense popularity also
among the indigenous Indonesians.
Another regulation is the prohibition
to celebrate Chinese temple festivals,
especially outside the premises. This
regulation has been relaxed in certain
areas and for certain occasions, depend-
ing on the evaluation of the permit-
giving authorities involved. For example,
Coppel reported witnessing a big cele-
'31) See Coppel [1983: 160-162].
bration at the well-known Sam Po
Kong temple In Semarang in August
1977, which attracted thousands of
people.32)
Still another measure is the encourage-
ment to change the Chinese name to
an Indonesian-sounding name. In 1966,
ir.. the town of Sukabumi in West Java,
the ethnic Chinese population responded
with an organized effort to have all of
them change their name. 33) But, as we
note today, name changing seems no
longer an issue, as the majority has
changed their name and most of the
younger generation have only Indonesian-
sounding or Christian or Western names.
There are exceptions; whereas Rudy
Hartono, the internationally-known bad-
minton player of Indonesia, changed
his name, the player expected to re-
place him, Liem Swie King, did not.
Neither did another well-known player,
Ivanna Lie. Some other names that
could be mentioned are that of the
historians Lie Tek Tjeng and Onghokham
and the economists Thee Kian Wie
and Kwik Kian Gie.
The Chinese lunar new year used
to be the occasion for the most overt
display of "Chineseness," with fireworks,
and the Chinatown area and Chinese
temples full of celebrants. Today, Chi-
nese new year is a family affair, cele-
brated especially when the grandparents
are still around. With the demise of
this older generation, this festivity will
probably also be a thing of the past.
32) See Coppel [1983: 164].
33) See Coppel [1983: 82-85].
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In the light of these developments
we can conclude that the recognition
ofand the adherence to Chinese cultural
elements are disappearing. Especially
among the younger generation, many
of whom have attended or are
attending the Christian-or Catholic-run
private schools, knowledge of traditional
Chinese culture and customs is pratically
non-existent.
Despite these changes within the eth-
nic Chinese community, moving away
from their "Chineseness," indications are
that the relations between the minority
ethnic Chinese and the majority indige-
nous Indonesians, are still characterized
by one of uneasiness, or even latent
hostility.
The most recent illustration of this,
is the incident in Surabaya in September
1986, which was prevented from erupt-
ing into a full-scale riot by the actions
of the military authorities. The inci-
dent was triggered off by the disclosure
that a young Javanese maid was se-
verely maltreated by the peranakan
Chinese family she worked for. As
reported in Tempo weekly magazine,34)
masses of people converged in front
of the house of the accused family,
shouting that they will run amok to
those "Cina," if the maid happens to
die from her wounds. About a week
later a similar case of maltreatment
was reported in another part of Surabaya.
The situation became tense, as becak
(trishaw) drivers and students started
massing around in the business area
34) Tempo October 4, 1986: 21, 22.
and cars with ethnic Chinese In it
were stoned. Every time they threw
a stone, the shout "cino" (Javanese
pronunciation of "cina") was heard.
The situation became grim when a
young ethnic Chinese businessman was
shot and killed in his car. According
to the authorities this was a criminal
act that has nothing to do with the
rioting. Still, conditions were explosive
and the authorities decided to come
out in force, succeeding in deterring
the masses from breaking out into seri-
ous rioting.
The ease with which anti-Chinese
behavior can be generated, points to
the continuing feelings of resentment,
based on a mixture of prej udice, envy
and a feeling of injustice. This resent-
ment is not only due to the perceived
dominance in the economy, but also to
the attitude and behavior, which is
usually expressed in the single term
"exclusiveness." In the view of the
majority ethnic Indonesians, the ethnic
Chinese feel superior to them and ex-
press this in their behavior by keeping
socially aloof, especially refusing to par-
ticipate in neighborhood activities, and
segregating residentially in the newly-
developed plush real estate areas.
To the majority ethnic Indonesians,
this attitude and behavior are an in-
tolerable affront to their sensibilities.
These feelings are clearly expressed by
Siswono in the book mentioned above.35)
He adheres to the concept of assimilation
applied to this group and suggests that
35) See Siswono [1985: 142, 143].
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" the social and cultural values of
the ethnic Chinese should disappear into
the values that exist in Indonesia in
a consistent manner and should be ex-
pressed in attitude and way of thinking."
He proposed some definite suggestions
as to what this group should do in this
respect and they all point to renounc-
ing this "exclusivism."
For example, he exhorts them to live
among the ethnic Indonesians and not
form their own residential enclaves; to
get rid of their arrogant attitude to-
wards ethnic Indonesians; to encourage
the younger generation to go to govern-
ment schools; to refrain from sending
their children abroad for study, be-
cause "... how can they develop feelings
of nationalism towards Indonesia, if they
spend the best part of their life abroad,
marry a foreign woman and then are
reluctant to return?"; if in business, not
to " ... misuse their large capital to bribe
officials and other important people in
certain positions"; not to avoid paying
tax that is due and acquire monopoly
rights in some business; to share ex-
perience and give guidance to indige-
nous businessmen, "not because forced by
a government regulation, but because
of the realization that these are fellow
citizens."
Considering that this book was pub-
lished only two years ago, and that
the author professes to have close rela-
tions with ethnic Chinese, the senti-
ment projected is revealing as to the
depth of resentment that still prevails
among ethnic Indonesians. Basically,
the indigenous majority puts the onus
on the ethnic Chinese to instigate
changes in their way of thinking, their
attitude and behavior, such that they
can be acceptable to the majority
population.
How do the ethnic Chinese react to
this challenge? A brief review of the
thinking and actions of the ethnic
Chinese shows that they have been by
no means united in their ideas towards
the solution of the "Chinese minority
problem." We can discern four lines
of thought that have come to the fore
since Independence.36)
The most prominent was the one
propounded by the Baperki (Badan
Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan
Indonesia) or Consultative Body for
Indonesian Citizenship, formed In
March 1954. From the beginning this
organization received wide support from
the ethnic Chinese, but when it be-
came closely associated with the Indo-
nesian Communist Party under the
leadership of the late Siauw Giok
Tjhan, many of the prominent figures
disassociated themselves. The line of
thought proposed by this organization
was "integration," to which they gave
36) This brief review of the thinking and actions
of the ethnic Chinese on the solution to the
"Chinese problem," for the ideas propounded
by the Baperki, Yap Thiam Hien and the
"assimilationists" is based on the various
writings in Suryadinata [1979]. For the
ideas of the "assimilationists" we also used
Coppel [1983: 46 ff. and 142-145]. The
ideas of Junus J ahja and his Ukhuwah
Islamiyah are taken from the book which
is a compilation of clippings from the mass
media: Jahja [1984].
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the meaning of the acceptance of the
ethnic Chinese as one of the suku
or ethnic groups, similar to the
indigenous ethnic groups. Thus, the
group will be an inherent part of the
Indonesian society, without being dis-
solved as a social-cultural entity. In
Siauw's view, this situation will be
achieved only, when Indonesia has be-
come a socialist state. In the aftermath
of the 1965 coup, this organization
was banned and the leaders detained.
The opposite view is expounded by
a group of mostly intellectuals, who,
In March 1960 put out a "statement
of assimilation" in the magazine Star
Week(y. This was the start of a move-
ment, espousing the idea of complete
dissolution of the group as a social-
cultural entity and its absorption into
the various indigenous ethnic groups.
Members of this group became part
of the LPKB (Lembaga Pembinaan
Kesatuan Bangsa or Institute for the
Promotion of National Unity). This
group was not a mass organization,
but consisted of a full board of officers
with specified tasks. They received the
support of the government and especially
the military. They became known
as the "assimilationists." From its in-
ception the leading figure is K. Sind-
hunata, a lawyer, Catholic and navy
officer (since retired). After 1965, the
group continued to receive support from
the government and in 1977, the name
was changed to Bakom-PKB (Badan
Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Ban-
gsa or Communication Body for the
Appreciation of National Unity). It
came under the aegis of the Ministry
of Home Affairs.
Yet another view was proposed by
Yap Thiam Hien, a prominent lawyer
and Christian church leader. His ideas
have been called by Suryadinata "plu-
ralist." Basically, however, they are
based on his deep sense of religion
and his total commitment to human
rights. Thus, the "therapy" he pro-
posed is "heart-cleansing," a change in
human attitudes to being "Christian-
centered" and "the rebirth of man in
Jesus Christ." We would therefore refer
to his ideas as "religionist." His was
a rather lone voice, most probably as
the ethnic Chinese consider it improb-
able for a Christian approach to find
a favorable response in a predominantly
Moslem society.
Most recently another "religionist"
approach emerged with the ideas put
forward by Junus Jahja, a Dutch-
educated economist, and former activist
of the LPKB and later of the Bakom-
PKB. He became a Moslem in June
1979, married a Moslem woman a
few years later, and served as a mem-
ber of the prestigious Majelis Ulama
Indonesia Pusat (Central Council of
Indonesian Ulamas) for the period
1980-1985 (another ethnic Chinese
Moslem served in the Council, Abdul
Karim Oey, a Moslem of long stand-
ing). Junus espouses the idea that the
solution of the "ethnic Chinese prob-
lem" lies in the massive conversion of
the group to Islam. In his opinion,
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by sharing the same religion, all the
barriers between the majority and
minority groups will be removed. To
this end he set up a foundation called
Yayasan Ukhuwah Islamiah or Islamic
Brotherhood as the vehicle to spread
Islam among the ethnic Chinese. He
IS quite realistic about its success,
however, acknowledging that despite
good press coverage, he estimates that
SInce 1979 there have been about 20,000
converts.
Of these four lines of thought, only
the Bakom-PKB and Junus Jahja's
Moslem group are still active and vocal
today. The Bakom-PKB has an execu-
tive board in most cities with a size-
able ethnic Chinese community, where
the members are prominent citizens of
this group. Their. appointment is with
the blessing of the local office of the
Bureau for social and political affairs
of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In
many ways this Board functions as a
liaison between the government and
the ethnic Chinese community. Junus
J ahja with his Ukhuwah Islamiyah
Foundation seeks to recruit new con-
verts and deepen the knowledge of
Islam of those already converted through
encouraging the latter to open their
homes for prayer meetings and the
study of Islam. J unus' efforts has the
full support of the Moslem leadership
and prominent people in the govern-
ment.
To what extent these two lines of
thought have the support of the ethnic
Chinese community is not clear. They
certainly cannot vouch to represent the
entire community. Among the ethnic
Chinese there seems to be a reluctance
to associate with a group or move-
ment that, though basically assimila-
tionist, as both groups are, still, in their
activities focus on the ethnic Chinese
as a group to which certain actions
need to be done.
Recently an alternative line of action
has emerged. This is by joining existing
groups within the majority society.
This is by no means a new phenomenon,
as since the formation of the Republic,
individual ethnic Chinese have been
active members of the then existing
national political parties.37 ) It is true,
though, that after the 1965 abortive
coup, ethnic Chinese as a group have
refrained from participating actively in
politics, though individuals have con-
tinued to do so, but in a rather muted
way.
Interestingly enough, this low pro-
file attitude seems to have given way
to a more visible stance in the par-
liamentary election of April 1987.
During the campaign period, an ethnic
Chinese Dutch-trained economist and
businessman, K wik Kian Gie, has
come to the fore in the camp of the
smallest of the three contestants in the
Election, the Partai Demokrasi Indo-
nesia or Indonesian Democratic Party
(PDI). His activities were such that
he rated mention in the Far Eastern
Economic Review: "The diverse nature
37) See Somers [1965]. Also Coppe1 [1983] and
Suryadinata [1979].
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of the party's appeal has been sym-
bolized by the appearance of Chinese-
Indonesian PDI leader Kwik Kian Gie
at major rallies." The article also noted
that "Kwik, a leading businessman, has
even highlighted his Chinese origin in
at least one PDI rally.... "38)
Whether this phenomenon IS an iso-
lated case, or the beginning of a trend
towards greater participation and fuller
acceptance in the socio-political arena,
eventually leading to a reduction of
conflict situations is a moot point.
No doubt, the government, its policies
and the implementation of these policies
as related to the "ethnic Chinese prob-
lem" play a key role in this respect.
Of equal importance are the views and
behavior of the ethnic Chinese them-
selves, whether as a minority group
they realize that accommodation to the
majority population is an imperative,
while individually, total assimilation IS
a line of action open to them.
Concluding Remarks
Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society
consisting of a majority of indigenous
ethnic groups and a minority of non-
indigenous or originally immigrant
groups. From the beginning of the
Republic, three minorities of foreign
origin were recognized: those of Chinese,
Arab and Dutch descent. 39) Of these
38) Far Eastern Economic Review April 23, 1987:
28.
39) The thinking on these minorities shortly
after the formation of the Republic, is ex-
pounded in Tabrani [1950].
groups only those of Chinese descent
have been and are still viewed as con-
stituting a problem. This is not only
because they are the largest In size,
compared to the other two groups,
but especially because of the role in
the economy they have played since
colonial times. As a matter of fact,
there are those who perceive this role
as even more pervasive today than at
any other time in the history of the
Republic.
The evidence so far indicates that
this role is not going to be reduced
in the near future, despite policies that
are intended to generate a more pro-
portionate and significant role of ethnic
Indonesians in the economy. The emer-
gence of the "cukong" phenomenon
has strengthened their position together
with that of their indigenous associates.
As such, they are part of the emerging
capitalist class of Indonesia. The evi-
dence also suggests that in retail trade
and in small and medium enterprises
they will continue to playa significant
role. It is generally agreed that this
role in the economy is one of the major
sources of conflict situations between
this group and the majority popula-
tion.
Nevertheless, we have shown that in
other areas changes are occurring that
may reduce the "visibility" of the ethnic
Chinese, removing some of the sources
of resentment, thereby leading to a
reduction of hostility towards this group.
This refers to their size, where contrary
to the perception of the majority pop-
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ulation, ethnic Chinese families consult
with private physicians in matters of
family planning, indicating that they
are themselves convinced of the ad-
vantage of having a small family.
Thus, their proportion to the general
population will probably remain no
more than 3%. Changes are also oc-
curring in the cultural area, moving
away from cultural expressions that are
considered of Chinese origin. This is
especially the case with the younger
generation, many of whom have be-
come Christians and are ignorant of
Chinese culture and customs.
These changes have come about for
a great part due to the assimilationist
policy of the government, by, among
others, closing the Chinese-language
schools and the prohibition of overt
expressions of elements of Chinese
culture.
Of the four lines of thought on the
solution to the "Chinese problem" that
have emerged among the group itself,
only the assimilationist view of the
Bakom-PKB and the "religionist" view
of Junus Jahja are vocal and active
today. However, the response of the
ethnic Chinese appears to be that they
see the Bakom-PKB as a kind of Hason
with the government to be used when
needed, while in regard to conversion
to Islam, Junus himself admits that
despite wide media coverage, the pro-
portion of converts is still small.
The recent overt partiCIpation In
politics as shown by a well-known eth-
nIC Chinese businessman and academic,
who campaigned for the PDI in the
parliamentary election of April 1987,
may show a trend towards greater
participation and acceptance in the
socio-political arena.
Nevertheless, we suggest that it is
the government and its policies that
will play a decisive role whether the
relations between the majority ethnic
Indonesians and the minority ethnic
Chinese will continue to be character-
ized by periodic outburst of social
unrest with the ethnic Chinese becom-
ing VIctIms of scape-goating and de-
flected agression. Or, whether a gradual
but continuous reduction in conflict
situations will occur.
In line with the pragmatic approach
in the implementation of development,
especially in the economic field, the
government shows determination to
suppress any attempt that might cause
a disruption. So far, indications are
that the government and the tech-
nocrats . in the National Development
Planning Board (Bappenas), at least,
consider the role of the ethnic Chinese
a positive contributing factor in the
development process. Hence, the quick
measures taken by the authorities to
squash actions that appear anti-Chinese.
On the other hand, on the part of
the ethnic Chinese, it is imperative to
diversify occupationally, away from
overconcentration in economic activities.
They also should realize that, having
elected to become Indonesian citizens,
their status as a minority group com-
pels them to find ways for an acceptable
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accommodation with the majority pop-
ulation.
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